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1 Introduction 
The relationship between public and private international law is a topic which has long been 
debated, and which remains highly controversial. Despite an increasing range of scholarship 
looking at connections between the two fields,1 some modern public and private international 
lawyers would doubt that any deep relationship exists between the two subjects – at least, that is, 
before having had the opportunity to read this book. In a textbook on private international law, 
the principal mention of public international law is typically in an expression of regret that the use 
of the term ‘private international law’ is misleading because the subject is not really ‘international 
law’.2 In a textbook on public international law, private international law is generally not mentioned 
at all, except for an occasional acknowledgment that in civil matters rules of public international 
law jurisdiction and rules of private international law may, debatably, have some interaction.3 
There are two main reasons why such doubts over the connections between public and private 
international law continue to be expressed. First, at least formally, rules of private international law 
are primarily national law, made by national courts or legislatures. In the division between the 
international and the domestic, they appear very much to fall within the sphere of domestic law. 
Sometimes rules of private international law are treated as rules of national private law, sometimes 
as rules of national procedural law – although as discussed further below they are better considered 
as their own distinctive field of law. Second, there is undoubtedly significant variation between the 
rules of private international law adopted in different states, and it would be very difficult to argue 
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1 See generally eg Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
Ralf Michaels, ‘Public and Private International Law: German views on Global Issues’ (2008) 4 Journal of Private 
International Law 121; Pascal Vareilles-Sommières, La Compétence Internationale de L’État en Matière de Droit Privé (LGDJ, 
1997); Andrew L Strauss, ‘Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction 
in Domestic Courts’ (1995) 36 Harvard International Law Journal 373; Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Influence of 
International Law on Civil Jurisdiction’ (1993) 6 Hague Yearbook of International Law 125; F A Mann, ‘The Doctrine 
of Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years’ (1984) 186 Recueil des Cours 19; Harold G Maier, ‘Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law’ (1982) 76 American 
Journal of International Law 280; Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘Public law in the international arena: conflict of laws, 
international law, and some suggestions for their interaction’ (1979) 163 Recueil des Cours 311. 
2 See eg Paul Torremans et al, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (15th edn, Oxford University Press, 
2017), p.15; Jonathan Hill and Maire Ni Shuilleabhain, Clarkson & Hill's Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press, 2016), p.3; Pippa Rogerson, Collier's Conflict of Laws (4th edn, Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.4. 
3 James Crawford and Ian Brownlie, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press, 
2012), pp.474-5ff. 
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that, at least under current international law, any particular rules of private international law are 
mandated. The main exception traditionally mooted is the question of a state’s exclusive authority 
(including civil jurisdiction) over questions of title to its land,4 which is sometimes considered an 
implication of territorial sovereignty, but even this has been questioned in some states.5 
This Chapter addresses these doubts by exploring six connections between public and private 
international law – connections of (1) principle, (2) history, (3) functional commonality, (4) policy 
incorporation, (5) shared objectives, and (6) methodology. Before addressing each of these, it notes 
a link between public and private international law which arises in the context of sources. This 
establishes a connection between these fields which is significant, but at the same time on its own 
quite limited. 
2 Sources 
The most obvious connection between public and private international law is that some rules of 
private international law are not found, or are not only found, in the domestic law of states – rules 
of private international law may be (and increasingly are) found in treaties. Some rules of private 
international law therefore take a form which is part of and governed by public international law, 
including its rules on the formation, validity and interpretation of treaties. Such treaties are most 
commonly negotiated under the auspices of an international organisation, the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law (which is discussed further below), but they may also be established 
by regional organisations as part of economic integration efforts, and at least historically could also 
often be found in bilateral or other regional agreements.6 European illustrations of this practice 
include the Brussels Convention of 1968,7 Rome Convention of 1980,8 and the various iterations 
of the Lugano Convention.9 While the former two Conventions have now been replaced with 
European Regulations, the Lugano Convention continues to function as a separate regional private 
international law treaty, designed to apply to non-EU Member States (particularly those in the 
                                                 
4 Mills (2009), at pp.239-44. See eg Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (recast), OJ L 351/1, 20 December 2012, Art 24(1). Under the common law this is traditionally analysed as a 
rule of non-justiciability rather than a rule of exclusive jurisdiction, although it is not clear whether this characterisation 
is helpful – it is principally a reflection of an historical common law distinction between local and transitory actions. 
See generally British South Africa Co v Companhia de Mozambique [1893] AC 602; Alex Mills, Party Autonomy in Private 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2018), Chapter 5.  
5 Note, for example, the abolition of the common law non-justiciability rule under the Jurisdiction of Courts (Foreign 
Land) Act 1989 (NSW), although the fact that a dispute concerns title to foreign land remains a significant factor in 
the exercise of jurisdictional discretion. 
6 On the international conventions operative between EU member states before European harmonisation, see eg P 
Jenard, ‘Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968’, OJ 79/C 59/1, at pp.6-7; Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 (consolidated version), OJ 98/C 27/1, Article 55. 
7 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 
(consolidated version), OJ 98/C 27/1. 
8 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (consolidated version), OJ 98/C 27/2. 
9 Most recently, Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 2007, OJ 2007/L 339/3 
  3 
European Free Trade Area). There are numerous other examples of similar treaties around the 
world, such as those adopted in Latin America.10 
Where such treaties are not directly enforceable as a matter of national constitutional law, national 
rules may also be necessary in order to implement these public international law obligations of the 
state. But even where that is the case, it is nevertheless still obviously true that state parties to these 
treaties owe obligations of private international law to each other as a matter of public international 
law, and that the scope and content of those obligations may be determined through the 
application of principles of public international law. As a consequence of this, it is further possible 
that international courts and tribunals, including for example the International Court of Justice, 
might be seized with disputes concerning the interpretation or breach of a private international 
law treaty. This indeed occurred in relation to a dispute between Belgium and Switzerland 
regarding the Lugano Convention, submitted to the ICJ in 2009, although the proceedings were 
discontinued in 2011. 
Is this enough to establish a significant connection between public and private international law? 
It may be observed that international lawyers do have a somewhat expansionist tendency to view 
anything in a treaty as automatically a ‘subject’ of international law, and it is certainly true that this 
is enough to make public international law relevant to private international law. But a deep 
connection between public and private international law is not necessarily established through this 
practice. A bilateral treaty which required each state to comply with a codified set of rules of 
contract law would affect the source of rules of contract law for those states, but this would not 
itself make contract law ‘international’ in character, at least not in a deep sense. However, if two 
states agree in a treaty to follow the same rules of contract law, or indeed the same rules of private 
international law, this signifies something more important than a change in formal sources. It 
signifies that the states adopting the treaty determined that it was necessary and appropriate to 
adopt such an international agreement – that regulation of contract law or private international law 
should take place at the international level, through the adoption of a formal commitment to 
harmonised rules of law. Such treaties do not, in practice, exist for rules of contract law, but they 
do exist in significant numbers for rules of private international law. To understand why states have 
adopted such treaties – and thus why the harmonisation of rules of private international law 
through treaties is a significant indicator of the international character of rules of private 
international law – requires a deeper examination of the connections between public and private 
international law.   
3 Connections 
This Chapter now examines six connections between public and private international law which 
are of greater significance, relating broadly to questions of the function and purpose of the two 
areas of law. These are not discrete points, but rather a series of filaments in a connecting web. 
                                                 
10 See eg the Montevideo Civil International Law Treaty 1889, amended 1940; Los Leñas Protocol on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments of other Mercosur States 1992; Buenos Aires Protocol on International Jurisdiction 
in Disputes Relating to Contracts 1994; Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts 
1994. 
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3.1 Principle 
The first stronger connection between public and private international law is suggested through a 
commonality of principles, which is particularly reflected in the central role played by the doctrine 
of comity in private international law. One of the fundamental premises of traditional private 
international law is that foreign law and courts are normatively equal to local law and courts. The 
choice between them is not, or at least not generally, one of superiority (outside a particular US 
tradition),11 but one of appropriateness (which law or court is best placed to resolve the dispute) 
or legitimacy (which law or court is entitled to regulate the relationship). Private international law 
does not give priority to the state or the law which is most democratic, or the court or the law 
which a judge decides has the better procedures or outcomes, or even (again, outside a particular 
US tradition)12 priority to forum law over foreign law. A guiding underlying principle of private 
international law is that a state should only impose its law or exercise its judicial authority in relation 
to a dispute where it has a recognised basis to do so; otherwise the proper course of action, 
motivated by comity, is to defer to another court’s jurisdiction or apply another state’s law. Where 
another court has exercised jurisdiction on an internationally recognised basis, the judgment of 
that court should further be recognised and enforced, subject to certain safeguards but without a 
review of the merits of the decision. The guiding principle is that the courts and the laws of fellow 
sovereigns are presumed to be equal to those of the forum, and entitled to mutual respect. Scholars 
and national courts frequently refer to the concept of ‘comity’ as a motivating force behind private 
international law and a source of this guiding principle. 
One of the central concerns of public international law is, similarly, regulating the respectful 
coexistence of sovereign states. Public international law is based on the principle of sovereign 
equality,13 which means that no state is superior to any other (there are no ‘second class 
sovereigns’), and each state is obliged to recognise the sovereignty of each other state. Of course 
no-one claims that states are equal in terms of their resources or power, but as a matter of 
international law they are possessed of identical sovereignty, however large or small they are. It 
has long been understood that sovereign equality does not necessarily imply an identity of legal 
rights or obligations – states may agree to bilateral or multilateral treaties under which they have 
different rights or obligations, perhaps most famously illustrated by the powers given to the five 
permanent members of the Security Council under the UN Charter. This inequality of rights and 
obligations, however, does not reflect an inequality of sovereignty, but is instead correctly viewed 
as an exercise of that sovereignty. Sovereign equality is reflected in a variety of contexts in public 
international law – for example, through obligations of sovereign immunity (long understood to 
be based on the principle that no domestic court should sit in judgment on a foreign sovereign, 
                                                 
11 Note the ‘better law’ approach advocated in Robert A. Leflar, ‘Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law’ 
(1966) 41 New York University Law Review 267; Robert A. Leflar, ‘Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing 
Considerations’ (1966) 54 California Law Review 1584. 
12 For an influential approach favouring forum law in the case of a ‘true conflict’ of laws, see eg Brainerd Currie, 
Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke University Press, 1963), p.181. 
13 See eg UN Charter, Article 2(1): “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.” 
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because to do so would be inconsistent with the sovereign equality of states)14 and non-
intervention.  
It does not take a leap of imagination to see the relationship between these two foundational 
principles – the normative equality of sovereign states in public international law, and the 
normative equality of their legal systems in private international law. This is not to suggest that in 
either case these are very solid or secure foundations. ‘Sovereignty’ in public international law and 
‘comity’ in private international law are obviously highly contested concepts. The key issue 
regarding the term sovereignty in public international law is whether it describes an a priori feature 
of statehood, or is a reflection of the general rights and obligations of states under international 
law.15 Put another way, the question is whether the principle of state sovereignty is a source or a 
product of international law – arguably it has shifted from the former conception to the latter over 
the course of the twentieth century. The classic fin de siècle definition of comity from the US 
Supreme Court, that it is “neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere 
courtesy and goodwill, upon the other”,16 similarly captures its inherent ambiguity at the beginning 
of the modern era of international law. Evidently comity cannot be a matter of ‘absolute 
obligation’, as no state is required to put the sovereignty of another state above its own. 
Nevertheless, it is more than courtesy, because the equal sovereignty of states is an important 
foundation of the international legal order, with significant normative pull. The role of comity in 
private international law thus suggests a vague but nevertheless important connection between the 
guiding principles of public and private international law – they both reflect and give effect to an 
underlying concept of sovereign equality. 
3.2 History 
A second major connection between public and private international law may be found in the 
historical links between the two subjects. A stronger connection between public and private 
international law can be revealed through understanding the historical origins of private 
international law, and indeed also public international law, as part of the ‘law of nations’.17  
The earliest origins of private international law are generally considered to be around the time of 
the Italian Renaissance – a time when an expansion of international trade and commerce led to an 
increase in the number of disputes with significant foreign elements, and thus in one important 
respect a time much like our own. The idea of private international law emerged to respond to 
these problems, as a mechanism to address the risk of conflicting legal treatment of private 
disputes, while at the same time accepting a degree of pluralism in substantive private law – the 
idea that different legal systems were normatively equal. But as private international law rules 
                                                 
14 The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 US 116 (1812); The Parlement Belge (1879) 5 PD 197; Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) [2012] ICJ Reports 99 at [57] (“The Court considers that the rule of 
State immunity occupies an important place in international law and international relations. It derives from the 
principle of sovereign equality of States, which, as Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations makes 
clear, is one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order.”). 
15 See eg Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2008) p.291 (describing 
sovereignty as “the legal competence which states have in general”); note the more ambivalent position in Crawford 
and Brownlie (2012), at p.448. 
16 Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113, 163-164 (1895). 
17 See generally Mills, Confluence (2009), Chapter 2; Alex Mills, ‘The Private History of International Law’ (2006) 55 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
  6 
selected between normatively equal legal systems, they were not themselves viewed as part of those 
systems. Private international law rules were instead developed by Renaissance lawyers as a distinct 
part of the universal natural law, ‘secondary’ norms which facilitated and supported the existence 
of diverse local legal systems by coordinating legal diversity. Private international law was thus first 
conceived of not as part of the local law which differed from city-state to city-state, but as part of 
a universal (natural) international law system – the ‘law of nations’ – which encompassed the 
modern territory of both public and private international law. 
This idea of private international law actually sustained and defined the discipline throughout most 
of its history. Under the statutist approach, perhaps the earliest idea of private international law, 
the potential for conflict between legal systems was addressed by attempting to develop a 
principled and analytical way of determining the scope or the effect of different laws. This was 
initially based on the idea that each statute ‘naturally’ belongs to one of two categories of laws, 
either ‘personal’ (thus applying  only to citizens, but regardless of their location) or ‘territorial’ 
(thus applying to everyone in the territory, regardless of citizenship). Later scholars adopted 
variations on this basic approach, emphasising the importance of either territorial or personal 
characteristics or connections, but right up to the nineteenth century the essentially internationalist 
character of the field was maintained.  
The two dominant nineteenth century figures in private international law, at least outside the 
Anglo-American tradition, may be singled out as influential archetypes. In the early nineteenth 
century, the German scholar Savigny argued for an account of private international law in which 
the basic unit of analysis is the ‘legal relation’, and the role of private international law was thus to 
‘ascertain the seat (the home) of every legal relation’. It was central to Savigny’s approach that the 
private international law rules he developed were higher level, universal norms – part of an 
international system of law, derived from the asserted existence of a community of territorial states. 
The Italian scholar and political figure Mancini, working later in the nineteenth century, shared 
much of Savigny’s approach, but argued for the adoption of nationality as the key connecting 
factor in private international law. This was based on a conception of the nation as founded on 
personal connections (the nation embodying the people and their history and culture) rather than 
Savigny’s conception of territorial power. But like Savigny, Mancini viewed private international 
law rules as ‘secondary norms’ which are essentially part of a broader system of law – in his case, 
the law of a community of nations, rather than Savigny’s community of territorial states. In both 
cases, rules of private international law were essentially characterised as serving an international 
function of global ordering or governance, coordinating relations between different legal orders – 
and in fact partly constituting the nature of the international legal order.  
This close relationship between public and private international law, viewed as integral parts of a 
broadly defined ‘law of nations’, faded in both theory and practice over the course of the 
nineteenth century. By the end of the nineteenth century, there was an increasing view that rules 
of private international law were not inherent parts of international law, because international law 
was concerned only with the ‘public’ relations between sovereign states. This theoretical 
development corresponded with an increased diversity of private international law rules in practice, 
partly prompted by a division which was ironically the product of the work of Savigny and Mancini 
– the debate over the use of territory (or personal territorial connections based on factual criteria 
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such as residence) or ‘nationality’ as connecting factors. This diversity made the view of private 
international law as fundamentally international in character increasingly seem untenable.  
The diversification of rules of private international law was not, however, simply a product of 
disagreement over what rules to adopt. In the early twentieth century, in federal systems such as 
the United States, the analysis and development of private international law increasingly focused 
on problems arising within the system, involving its constituent states. The resolution of these 
problems increasingly drew on national policies and domestic constitutional concerns, and a lack of 
distinction between the inter-state and foreign contexts shifted the focus away from the traditional 
‘international’ perspective on private international law.18 There is an argument that a similar process 
has occurred again more recently, in the late twentieth century, as the development of EU private 
international law has focused on domestic objectives such as the efficient functioning of the 
internal market rather than international policy goals.19 
One late nineteenth century response and reaction to these developments was a series of Hague 
Conferences on Private International Law, held between 1893 and 1904, to work toward the 
international harmonisation of private international law. This was of course the precursor to the 
foundation of the Hague Conference on Private International Law as an international institution 
in 1955.20 Despite these efforts, in the early parts of the twentieth century, the idea that public and 
private international law were entirely separate disciplines appeared to become widely established. 
This was a product both of a narrowing of the domain of public international law, to exclude 
‘private’ actors and their relations, limiting public international law to the law between sovereign 
actors, and of the reconceptualisation of private international law itself as a matter of national law 
and national policy. These matters are discussed further below. 
3.3 Functional commonality 
A third major connection between public and private international law that can be highlighted is a 
connection of functional commonality. Public international law includes so-called rules of 
‘jurisdiction’, which determine the permitted scope of a state’s exercise of regulatory authority.21 A 
state may, for example, criminalise conduct in its territory, or the conduct of its nationals outside 
its territory. The essential approach is that each state act of regulation must be justified by one of 
the accepted grounds of jurisdiction in order to comply with public international law. In the 
absence of a connection of territory or nationality, states may be able to rely on universal 
jurisdiction for certain matters which are considered to be a concern for all states. The scope of 
universal jurisdiction is of course highly contested in public international law. It is clearly 
recognised in certain treaties, but only for a narrow range of international crimes. 
                                                 
18 See generally eg Alex Mills, ‘Federalism in the European Union and the United States: Subsidiarity, Private Law and 
the Conflict of Laws’ (2010) 32 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 369; Alex Mills, ‘The Identities 
of Private International Law – Lessons from the US and EU Revolutions’ (2013) 23 Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law 445. 
19 See generally eg Alex Mills, ‘Private International Law and EU External Relations: Think Local Act Global, or Think 
Global Act Local?’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 541. 
20 See generally https://www.hcch.net/en/about; Alex Mills and Geert De Baere, ‘T.M.C. Asser and Public and 
Private International Law: The Life and Legacy of ‘a Practical Legal Statesman’’ (2011) 42 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 3.  
21 See generally Alex Mills, ‘Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law’ (2014) 84 British Yearbook of International 
Law 187. 
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The focus of discussion of jurisdiction in public international law is generally on exercises of public 
authority, particularly through criminal law. Because of the exclusion of ‘private’ concerns from 
public international law, doubts have sometimes even been expressed as to whether these rules 
apply to private law regulation or disputes. There is, however, little in principle to support such 
doubts. Rules of private law are exercises of ‘public’ governmental authority as much as rules of 
criminal law, and they are ultimately sanctioned through coercive judicial and executive powers. If 
a court orders that a party is liable to pay damages or face seizure of their property because they 
have breached tort law, this is not characteristically different from an order that they are liable to 
pay a fine or face seizure of the same property because they have breached criminal standards. The 
ultimate recipient of the penalty may differ, but the state power which is exercised to compel 
payment does not. Public and private law remedies indeed often overlap, and may be 
interchangeable. In different legal systems, different approaches are often taken to regulating the 
same issues – for example, competition law, defamation law or environmental law may be regulated 
by criminal law or by private law, or a combination of both. The distinction between public and 
private law has long been criticised as a legal artifice, and in any case does not appear materially 
relevant to the question of whether state regulatory power is implicated. A state’s contract law, no 
less than its criminal law, pursues national policy objectives. As many scholars have observed,22 all 
law is, at least in one sense, public law. 
The case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co in which the US Supreme Court gave judgment in 
201323 provides perhaps the clearest and strongest recent support for this argument – that private 
disputes still engage public international law jurisdiction. Various states intervened in the 
proceedings, including the European Commission on behalf of the European Union, and (jointly) 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (the home jurisdictions of the defendant). A central 
question in these submissions was whether it would be compatible with international law for US 
courts to hear the proceedings, given the lack of connections between the dispute or the defendant 
and the United States. While the arguments of the intervening states may have differed, they all 
demonstrated that States do believe that the rules of jurisdiction must be complied with in relation 
to civil proceedings, and that they do object if they think their nationals are being subject to 
exorbitant exercises of jurisdiction (a concern which a cynic might observe carries particular weight 
when those nationals are oil companies).  
This is a reflection of a broader trend. In a range of ways, public international law scholarship has, 
in recent years, re-opened its attention to matters which were traditionally characterised as ‘private’ 
and thus as falling outside the scope of the discipline, recognising that they have important ‘public’ 
governance implications and effects.24 To put this another way, public international law has 
increasingly recognised (once again) that private law relations matter. This concern is by no means 
                                                 
22 See eg Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law in Public Law’, in Mark Elliott and David Feldman (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to Public Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015), p.56 (“Maybe we should say that in the last analysis 
all law involves the operation of the state on society; all law is public law in some ultimate sense”, citing to Hans 
Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight (University of California Press, 1967), p.282). The argument may also 
be found in various places in Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, trans. George Simpson (The Free Press, 
1933, originally published in French in 1893). 
23 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
24 See generally eg Christine E. J. Schwöbel, ‘Whither the private in global governance?’ (2012) 10 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 1106; Robert Wai, ‘Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global 
Society’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 471. 
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limited to questions of private international law in the traditional sense (rules on jurisdiction, choice 
of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments), but encompasses a variety of private legal 
relations which have important and significant impacts on a whole range of matters of international 
and public concern, including some which are addressed in this book – such as sovereign bonds, 
or global supply chains, or carbon trading contracts, or claims arising out of cross-border health 
care. The term ‘private international law’ is sometimes co-opted to capture this broader range of 
international private law-making. But traditional private international law still has a particular 
significance to this regulation, because it is, in practice, private international law which determines 
how regulatory authority over private law questions is allocated between states – itself an important 
function of global governance. The private international law decision about which state or states 
gets to regulate private legal relations also matters, along with the content of that regulation 
(generally, what rights and obligations are created under private international contracts), because 
that allocation determines what legal system regulates the contracts.25 This in turn determines, for 
example, what public interests are accommodated (potentially affecting or overriding contractual 
rights and obligations), and whether in practical terms a party is able to achieve access to justice – 
if litigation can only take place in a forum which is remote or expensive, this may not be realistically 
possible. It is also private international law which determines the even more contested question of 
when regulatory authority may be taken away from states altogether and exercised by non-state 
parties – when arbitral tribunals may resolve disputes instead of courts, and when either may apply 
principles of non-state law instead of state law to govern the relationship between the parties.26 
Put simply, if public international lawyers care about private law regulation, and they should, public 
international lawyers must care about private international law. This recognition that public 
international law rules of jurisdiction apply to matters of private law reveals a functional 
commonality between public and private international law rules. Both impose limits on the 
circumstances in which a state may assert its regulatory authority over a particular person, 
relationship or event.  
It is important to recognise that while public international law establishes that a state may not 
impose its regulation in the absence of a recognised justification, it does not (at least generally) 
require that state regulation be exercised where such a recognised justification exists. Principles of 
access to justice, developing particularly in the context of human rights law, may in future have an 
increased role in requiring states to exercise and perhaps even expand their grounds of civil 
jurisdiction,27 but at present they have had a limited influence, except in relation to the protection 
of weaker parties (like consumers or employees) and less frequently in the adoption of forum of 
necessity rules of jurisdiction. Their effect has been felt more in the context of practical barriers 
                                                 
25 See generally Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernández Arroyo (eds), Private International Law and Global Governance 
(Oxford University Press, 2014); Mills, Confluence (2009). 
26 See further Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (forthcoming 2018). 
27 See generally James J Fawcett, Máire Ní Shúilleabháin and Sangeeta Shah, Human Rights and Private International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2016); Mills (2014); Michael M Karayanni, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of Access to 
Justice Rights’, in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernández Arroyo (ed), Private International Law and Global Governance 
(Oxford University Press, 2014); Amnesty International, ‘Injustice incorporated: Corporate abuses and the human 
right to remedy’ (2014), POL 30/001/2014, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL30/001/2014/en; Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice as a Human 
Right (Oxford University Press, 2007); James J Fawcett, ‘The Impact of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private 
International Law’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
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to litigation, such as the availability of legal aid.28 States are generally free, under public international 
law, to decide whether to exercise any of the available grounds of jurisdiction. 
An important implication of this is that there is scope for a range of different rules of private 
international law to function compatibly with public international law. So while it is true that public 
international law does not generally dictate specific rules of private international law, that does not 
establish that there is no connection between the two disciplines. Public international law defines 
the outer limits within which national rules of private international law must operate. Those 
national rules are then an implementation of both public international limits, and, within those 
limits, policies concerning matters of private international law, which may themselves be national 
or international in character. Private international law is thus a hybridisation of international 
obligation and national and international policy. The picture of jurisdiction in private international 
law also includes considerations of territoriality and personality (through connections of 
nationality, domicile, and residence) as competing approaches to international ordering, mirroring 
these conceptions in public international law. It also perhaps includes consideration of ideas of 
universal civil jurisdiction as an emerging principle, through the idea of a forum of necessity, based 
on arguments that the rights or interests of individuals should be recognised alongside those of 
states.29 
This is not to say that private international law is ‘subsumed’ by public international law. Private 
international law has its own policy concerns and interests, which operate within the public 
international law framework. Some of these have been discussed earlier in this Chapter, and some 
are discussed further below. And rules of private international law are also some of the most 
important evidence of what states view as accepted grounds of public international law jurisdiction, 
and what they view as ‘exorbitant’. Private international law sources were indeed historically one 
of the strongest influences on the development of public international law jurisdictional rules, and 
they can and should continue to influence that development. Perhaps most distinctively, private 
international law rules almost universally recognise the direct power for private parties to 
determine the law which governs their legal relationship or the courts which have power over 
them, through an exercise of party autonomy in the form of a choice of law or choice of court 
clause. This is a challenge for public international lawyers – private international law encompasses 
a conception of individuals as having a kind of jurisdictional power, which does not seem to fit 
comfortably in traditional inter-state conceptions of public international law. It seems to accept a 
kind of individual sovereignty, alongside the sovereignty of the state.30 
But aside from such points of friction, the functional commonality between the two disciplines of 
public and private international law highlights the importance of recognising that they are in a 
relationship of close mutual influence. Put simply, private international law rules are shaped by 
rules of public international law, because they operate within the constraints of international rules 
on jurisdiction. But rules of public international law have also been shaped, and continue to be 
shaped, by the practices of states in the context of private international law, which at times go 
beyond and challenge the traditional framework of public international law jurisdiction. 
                                                 
28 Note eg the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on International Access to Justice. 
29 See further Mills (2014). 
30 See further Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (forthcoming 2018); Mills (2014). 
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3.4 Policy incorporation 
A fourth significant connection between public and private international law relates to the matter 
of policy incorporation. This arises particularly in the development of rules of the private 
international law doctrine of public policy, which operates as a defence against the recognition and 
enforcement of a foreign judgment, or an exception to the application of foreign law. Public policy 
is the means through which states may determine that other policy considerations outweigh those 
of private international law itself – that the usual obligations to recognise a foreign judgment or 
apply a foreign law are trumped by the harm which would be caused in doing so in the particular 
circumstances, because the judgment or law offends against important principles. Public policy, in 
other words, is the limit of the principle of normative equality which underlies private international 
law.31 It tells us ‘how different is too different’. For this reason, however, public policy must be 
construed narrowly, otherwise it would risk undermining private international law altogether – a 
foreign judgment or law must not be rejected simply because it is different, but only where that 
difference is fundamentally objectionable. 
Different considerations apply, however, where the public policy concerned is not derived from 
national policy or interest, but from concerns of public international law such as international 
human rights law – sometimes referred to as ‘truly international’ public policy. In these 
circumstances, the application of public policy is not a projection of one state’s norms on matters 
which would otherwise be governed by the other state, a denial of mutual respect, but rather a 
recognition and enforcement of norms which bind both states. National courts have rightly 
suggested that they should be readier to apply public policy in such circumstances – for example, 
in a House of Lords decision, refusing to apply Iraqi law which purported to nationalise aircraft 
seized in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, contrary to the UN Charter and resolutions of the Security 
Council.32  
In such cases, giving effect to norms of international law by refusing to apply foreign law or 
recognise a foreign judgment essentially involves prioritising other rules of public international law 
over the rules of ‘jurisdiction’ which provide the foundations of private international law – but 
such a prioritisation may well be demanded by public international law itself. It might normally be 
perfectly compatible with international law, and perhaps even a requirement, for UK courts to 
apply Iraqi law to questions of title to property located in Iraq, but doing so in the circumstances 
of the Kuwait Airways case would have involved violating a Security Council resolution and 
indirectly giving effectiveness to an unlawful use of force, both contrary to other obligations of 
public international law. It may be suggested therefore that a state which breaches important norms 
of international law can no longer expect to benefit from the principles of sovereign equality and 
comity which underpin public and private international law. 
This internationalised conception of public policy thus highlights a distinct connection between 
public and private international law. While private international law might ordinarily reflect public 
international rules of jurisdiction, through the doctrine of public policy it is also open to the direct 
                                                 
31 See further Alex Mills, ‘The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law’ (2008) 4 Journal of Private 
International Law 201. 
32 Kuwait Airways v Iraqi Airways [2002] UKHL 19. For further analysis see Alex Mills, ‘The Mosul Four and the Iran 
Six’, in Jessie Hohmann and Daniel Joyce (eds), International Law’s Objects: Emergence, Encounter and Erasure through Object 
and Image (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2018). 
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consideration and application of other matters of public international law which might in certain 
cases trump those ordinary jurisdictional rules. 
3.5 Shared objectives 
A further element to the ‘internationalism’ of private international law may be found in its own 
distinct policy objectives. As noted earlier, private international law has its own policy concerns 
and interests which occupy the space of regulatory discretion left by public international law. Like 
public international law, it governs the allocation of regulatory authority between states, relying 
traditionally on territorial or personal connections to justify regulation. But within the discipline 
of private international law, there are a range of policy goals which have been developed, which 
relate to how this regulation should function. And importantly, a number of these policies are 
themselves international in their scope and conception. 
For example, rules of private international law have traditionally (through choice of law rules in 
particular) sought to achieve objectives of decisional harmony, ensuring that the same decision is 
reached wherever in the world a dispute is litigated. Together with rules limiting overlapping 
jurisdiction and requiring the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, this policy aims 
to minimise the risk that parties may be subject to inconsistent regulation, leading to potentially 
conflicting exercises of state enforcement powers. Another related principle is that incentives and 
opportunities for forum shopping should be reduced (through a combination of both choice of 
law rules and jurisdictional rules), and thus litigation should take place in the most appropriate 
forum rather than the forum which most favours the claimant – which would risk again parallel 
proceedings and inconsistent regulation, as well as inefficient dispute resolution. To put these 
policy goals another way, private international law has long been concerned, among other things, 
with facilitating cross-border activity by coordinating the peaceful coexistence of sovereign states, 
striving to reduce the ‘conflict of laws’ between them. 
It is of interest that these concerns have not been traditionally addressed in public international law 
jurisdictional rules, which simply allow for potentially overlapping and conflicting exercises of 
regulation, without rules of priority to decide which rule or rules should prevail. But there is 
increasing recognition in international law of the need to avoid conflicting regulation, of the 
benefits of states acting in cooperation rather than independently and unilaterally. This is a context 
in which public international law may have something to learn from private international law. 
In any case, the objectives of decisional harmony, of avoiding a conflict of laws, are not objectives 
which can be reached by each state acting unilaterally in adopting its own national rules of private 
international law, in pursuit of national policies. They require a process of formal or informal 
coordination, the recognition by states that they have collective interests and goals which may be 
best served through rules of private international law which are, at least to some extent, 
internationally harmonised. Thus even where the source of private international law is national 
law, many of its ambitions, effects and objectives are (at least traditionally) international. It is or at 
least can be international in its outlook and its function. 
It is this ‘internationalist’ perspective on private international law which is exemplified by the work 
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The work of the Hague Conference, in 
preparing treaties dealing with matters of private international law, is more than just equivalent to 
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harmonising contract law – it is more than international in form, and more than just the 
development of public international law sources for private international law. It is a continuation 
of private international law’s international origins and ambitions, and its public function or 
potential function as a matter of global governance. According to this tradition, part of the 
function of rules of private international law is fundamentally ‘public’, ‘international’, and 
‘systemic’ in its substantive character – it has at least a relationship of functional equivalence to 
some of the global governance ambitions of public international law. Similar ‘public’ functions can 
be observed in federal or similar systems in which private international law rules serve the function 
of ordering the internal distribution of regulatory authority, a role which private international law 
has increasingly played in the European Union, Australia and Canada. While as noted above these 
developments have in the past discouraged thinking about private international law from an 
international perspective (by instead increasing focus on the issues as they arise within a federal 
system), ironically they illustrate the way in which private international law might be applied to 
achieve equivalent public, systemic objectives, at the international level, closely aligned to those of 
public international law.  
Private international law can undoutedly exist without such an internationalist approach. Private 
international law rules can be designed to act purely for national policy interests, and make no 
effort at international coordination or achieving systemic policy goals. But rules of private 
international law are often poor devices to achieve substantive policy objectives, and the 
international systemic goals of traditional private international law are potentially a unique 
contribution which it could make to global governance. An internationalist vision of the character 
and objectives of private international law has been strongly influential in the history of the 
discipline, and could well remain central to its future. 
3.6 Methodology 
A further potential connection between public and private international law is a connection of 
methodology. Private international law essentially addresses the problem of deciding which court 
or legal order gets to regulate an issue, when there are multiple courts or legal orders which have 
connections with that issue. As well as serving its own purposes, private international law also 
presents a methodology or a technique which might be adopted and adapted in other contexts. 
This raises the question of whether public international law could be one such potential context.33 
There are two distinct ways in which private international law might be applied by analogy at the 
international level – the first relates to jurisdiction, and the second to choice of law. In the context 
of jurisdiction, it may first be noted that there has been a proliferation of international courts and 
tribunals, both institutionalised (for example, the ICJ and the WTO dispute settlement system) 
and ad hoc (for example, international investment law). The increase in the number of courts and 
tribunals raises the possibility that more than one forum may be seised of a single dispute or two 
(or more) closely related disputes. Clear rules governing the relationship between international 
courts and tribunals have not developed as part of international law, although a number of 
                                                 
33 See particularly eg Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws? Different Techniques 
in the Fragmentation of Public International Law’, in Tomer Broude and Yuval Shany (eds), Multi-Sourced Equivalent 
Norms in International Law (Hart, 2011). 
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potential principles have emerged,34 drawing on the more sophisticated experience of private 
international law in the management of parallel proceedings.35 The two main techniques are those 
of forum non conveniens and lis pendens (in either case supported by the further doctrine of res judicata). 
The first of these (closely associated with the common law) asks each court to analyse the dispute 
and to determine whether it is the most appropriate forum to resolve the issues, regardless of 
whether it is first seised of the dispute. A stay of proceedings may be indefinite, or it may be 
temporary to allow a foreign court to resolve closely related issues before proceedings continue.36 
The second of these (closely associated with the civil law tradition and EU regulation) gives priority 
to the court first seised, as either a mandatory or discretionary requirement.37 Either technique is 
adaptable to the international level as a way of framing mutually respectful relationships between 
international courts and tribunals, often (tellingly) articulated as a matter of comity.38 
The second potential area of application of private international law principles at the international 
level concerns questions of substantive law. As is well known, public international law has 
developed a range of distinct ‘regimes’ – the regimes of trade law, investment law, environmental 
law, human rights law, and increasingly numerous others. One of the most pressing problems of 
public international law is how to deal with questions of regime interaction – how to try to ensure 
that these independently developing regimes do not contradict each other, and that international 
law does not thereby become incoherent as a system. In public international law research this is 
often described as the problem of fragmentation – there are a range of techniques available to 
public international lawyers to resolve such questions, but it is unclear whether these are 
satisfactory or sufficient (or themselves coherent).39 The issue of fragmentation is not only a 
theoretical question but is also reflected in a range of quite specific practical problems. For 
example, can a state block the import of goods, contrary to trade law obligations, on environmental 
law grounds? Can a state cancel the license of a foreign investor for failure to comply with human 
rights law? Private international law is sometimes viewed as a potential source of further techniques 
which might be drawn on to address these kinds of question. Adapted to this context, the 
techniques of private international law would still strive to accommodate multiple normatively 
equal legal orders, but the legal orders would not be those of states, but regimes or fields of public 
international law.  
However, a note of caution on such endeavours is necessary. Traditional techniques of private 
international law are focused on choice, and avoiding overlaps – determining which legal order 
                                                 
34 See generally Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
35 See generally Torremans et al (2017), Chapter 13. 
36 This is probably the best analysis of The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Order No 3, 24 June 2003) 
(UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal, PCA), because at the time the tribunal stayed its own proceedings no case had been 
commenced before the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
37 See generally eg Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ 
L 351/1, 20 December 2012, Arts 29-34; Campbell McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation (Brill, 2009). 
38 See eg Thomas Schultz and Niccolò Ridi, ‘Comity and International Courts and Tribunals’ (2017) 50 Cornell 
International Law Journal (forthcoming, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957570); The MOX Plant Case 
(Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Order No 3, 24 June 2003) (UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal, PCA), [28].  
39 See generally the Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of international law: 
difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law, 13 April 2006, A/CN.4/L.682; Tomer Broude and 
Yuval Shany (eds), Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law (Hart, 2011); Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in 
Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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should apply, generally to the exclusion of others. It is not clear that the problems of public 
international law regime interaction are ones that should be resolved through such a technique – 
indeed the application of such a technique may be highly problematic. If we are asking whether a 
state can block the import of goods on environmental grounds, the answer should not be a choice 
– deciding whether it is really a trade issue or an environmental issue. It is clear that it is both a trade 
issue and an environmental issue. The solution should therefore not be found in a technique of 
choice, but in techniques of normative accommodation, or hybridisation – but here, a horizontal 
hybridisation rather than a vertical one. Some of those techniques can be found in international 
law itself, such as in the principles of treaty interpretation. There is also some private international 
law scholarship which has argued for such hybridisation instead of the traditional paradigm of 
choice in private international law, which might well be a profitable source of inspiration for public 
international lawyers.40 This technique is also sometimes adopted by arbitral tribunals, which may 
hybridise rules of national contract law when applying non-state law, particularly if directed to do 
so by the parties.41 This is not, however, the mainstream of private international law, particularly 
as practiced by courts. 
But perhaps there is also a lesson for private international law in this experience. Is hybridisation 
something that courts could or should do more? It may indeed be argued that it is something that 
private international law already does in a range of indirect ways, such as through the rules on the 
proof of foreign law, or on the substance/procedure distinction, or through the device of 
depeçage. It is not only public international lawyers who may learn from the techniques of private 
international law – there is also scope for further reflection from private international lawyers as 
to whether the solutions developed in public international law for the problems of regime 
interaction offer lessons for private international law. 
There is, finally, another more direct methodological intersection between public and private 
international law which may be highlighted. An international court or tribunal typically applies 
rules of public international law, but it may also be required to determine what law governs a 
contract. This might be a particularly common concern for investor-state arbitrations, where the 
parties often have a contractual relationship which can have an impact on the host state’s 
investment treaty obligations. This raises the question of how the court or tribunal should decide 
what law governs the contract. As an international court or tribunal, it will at least generally have 
no ‘forum choice of law rules’ to apply, and applying those of any particular state could be 
problematically question-begging. The best answer to this conundrum could be that international 
courts and tribunals need their own ‘transnational’ choice of law rules, their own truly 
                                                 
40 See eg Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, ‘Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance 
in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology’ (1974) 88 Harvard Law Review 347. This idea is also developed in 
some contemporary scholarship on legal pluralism – see eg Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 80 
Southern California Law Review 1155. 
41 See eg Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Constructions Ltd  [1993] AC 334;  Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Transnational 
Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision-Making?’ (2000) 17 Arbitration International 59; see discussion in 
Thomas Schultz, ‘Some Critical Comments on the Juridicity of Lex Mercatoria’ (2008) 10 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 667 at p.671ff. See similarly Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial 
Arbitration’ (1985) 34 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 747 at p.752ff; Carlo Croff, ‘The Applicable Law 
in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?’ (1982) 16 International Lawyer 
613. 
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internationalised private international law.42 This was already arguably recognised by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Serbian Loan cases in the 1920s.43 The increased 
judicialisation of international dispute resolution, with a range of international courts and tribunals 
dealing with disputes that are likely to touch on a range of issues of national law, potentially opens 
up a new field for private international law – a direct need for the development of an 
internationalised private international law. The development of harmonised rules of private 
international law by institutions such as the Hague Conference would thus have the added benefit 
of creating transnational rules of private international law which may be essential to the work of 
international courts and tribunals. 
4 Conclusions 
The relationship between public and private international law is not uncontroversial, and it is not 
simple. It cuts across a whole range of dimensions. Connections of principle in ideas of comity 
and sovereign equality. Deep historical connections in the development of each discipline as part 
of the law of nations. A functional commonality, highlighted through the role of public 
international law rules on jurisdiction in shaping private international law, and visa versa. Direct 
policy incorporation, through the doctrine of truly international public policy. Increasingly shared 
international objectives of avoiding regulatory conflict. And perhaps through a mutual influence 
of methodologies. This is a dynamic and difficult terrain to explore, but it is important that private 
international lawyers are not blind to the global regulatory effects and potential of private 
international law, and that public international lawyers are not blind to the significance of private 
international regulation. The contributors to this book are to be applauded for their intrepid 
interventions. 
                                                 
42 See further eg Hege Elisabeth Kjos, Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration: The Interplay Between National and 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
43 Serbian Loans Case, France v Yugoslavia (1929) PCIJ Ser A, No 20, Judgment 14. 
